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Abstract
Often, groups of people behave differently than individuals. Influential members
in a group can cause other members in the group to make irrational decisions.
Focus groups are used within marketing to see how a group will react to a new
idea or product. Focus group researchers will often create separate focus groups
consisting of people who are alike so that influential members are less likely to
occur. However, influence occurring in the population due to interactions consist-
ing of heterogeneous people may not show up in these focus groups due to their
homogeneity. In this paper I present a model of a population with two types of
reactions to a new policy, non-dissenter and dissenter. Dissenters are against the
new policy, and feel very strongly about their opinion. Non-dissenters are not
against the policy, but their opinion is weak. If the policy is enacted, members of
the population interact on a one-on-one basis, sharing their opinion of the policy
until the population has reached a consensus on the policy. Modeling shows that
even a small proportion of dissenters can cause large shifts in the average opin-
ion in the population overtime. I then present a model of a focus group where
members within the focus group share their opinion to all other members. I find
that focus groups that consist of members from the targeted population can be
used to estimate the population consensus, and that these focus groups can be
composed of randomly chosen members of the population. I then go on to show
that homogenous focus groups, or focus groups consisting of all non-dissenters or
all dissenters, create a bias if used in the estimation.
1 Introduction
Groups of people are not people. Terms such as “groupthink” and “herd
behavior” describe the often irrational behaviors that groups succumb to
when trying to make a decision jointly or as indviduals. For example, the Bay
of Pigs Invasion during the Cuban Missile crisis involved a group of highly
skilled military tacticians who began to value the group more than their in-
dividual opinions. Questionable assumptions about the military strength of
Cuba quickly became unquestionable truths to the group planning the inva-
sion (Janis 1982) [5].
Focus groups are used to see how a group of individuals in a targeted pop-
ulation will react to a new product or idea (Lindlof, Taylor 2002) [8]. In the
past 30 years, the use of focus groups in research has seen a marked increase.
In 1977, only a couple dozen focus group reports were written, most of which
were in market research. In 2001, several thousand articles were written in
a variety of topics (Fern 1-4) [3]. This increase, however, has been met with
criticisms. In this paper, I will focus on a particular criticism; Focus groups
are prone to common “group biases” such as herd behavior, groupthink,and
social desirability bias (MacDougall, Baum 1997) [9](Carey, Smith 1994) [1].
Focus groups tend to have six to eight members and someone to guide
the flow of discussion, called the focus group moderator (Krueger 4) [7]. The
moderator is responsible for asking the group questions and making sure ev-
eryone has equal weight in the discussion. The focus group moderator then
takes notes or records audio and/or video while the focus group discusses the
topic on hand (Krueger 137) [7]. This information is then handed off to the
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researchers, who look for similarities or dissimilarities between focus groups
(Krueger 141) [7].
An advantage of focus groups is that as people in the focus group inter-
act, there is a “chain” of ideas, and that members in the group feed off the
ideas of other members in the group (Lindlof, Taylor 2002) [8]. However,
this “chain” of ideas has often been criticized for being analogous to herd be-
havior or groupthink, and that individual opinions are not fairly considered
(Rushkoff 2005) [11]. For example, if the focus group contains both males
and females, focus group researchers note that males will often have stronger
opinions, be more likely to convince the females in the group of their opin-
ion, and are less likely to be swayed by the opinions of others in the focus
group (Krueger 73) [7]. Another example of “groupthink” in focus groups is
that people of different ages are usually separated in focus groups, as older
members are often more persuasive than younger members (Fern 35) [3]. In
general, people who traditionally have power or prestige in a society are more
likely to convince those with less power or prestige and are less likely to be
convinced by the opinions of others (Fern 30-32) [3]. This is problematic for
focus group researchers because this means that certain opinions are censored
or left out of the discussion (Krueger 72) [7].
The precautionary solution to this problem is to create homogenous fo-
cus groups (Krueger 72) [7]. For example, instead of having a heterogeneous
focus group containing both men and women, have one focus group of just
men and another with just women (Fern 35) [3]. Often this still does not
solve the problem of “dominant talkers” (Krueger 111) [7] who still sway
opinions within the group. Focus group researchers rely on the focus group
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moderator to keep these people from swaying opinions. Another solutions
is to include a “devil’s advocate” that will challenge dominant talkers with
questions about their positions (MacDougall, Baum 1997) [9].
However, people are influenced by the opinions of others everyday. For
example, women tend to speak less when there are more men and room
as well as agree with their solutions to problems (Karpowitz, Mendelberg,
Shaker 2012) [6]. Group communication outside of focus group research has
no moderators, and those with weak opinions are quickly adopt opinions sim-
ilar to their community. An example of this is New Coke: While it was
popular in the initial market research phase, with New Coke having up to
a 10-20% margin over Coca-Cola in blind taste tests (Pendergrast 352) [10],
the product failed in less than eighty days after release. (Greising 113) [4].
When New Coke held focus groups, they decided to ignore the results be-
cause people would herd around those who were against the change (Greising
114) [4]. But it was exactly those who were against the change that would
initiate the huge public backlash against New Coke. While some think New
Coke showed that focus groups are useless(Rushkoff 2005) [11], others think
we should shift the focus of focus groups: Focus groups can be used to esti-
mate the effect of social influence (Schindler 1992) [12].
In this paper, I start with a principal trying to decide whether or not to
enact a change of policy; For example, whether or not to change Coca-Cola
with New Coke. The success of the policy is based on the average opinion
in a population.The population consists of two types: dissenter and non-
dissenter. When the non-dissenters hear the news about the change, they
react positively, but do not feel strongly about the change. The dissenters,
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on the other hand, react negatively and feel very strong about the change.
If the change is enacted, the dissenters will convince the non-dissenters that
the change is a bad idea, lowering the average population opinion of the
change over time. If the principal is aware of this influence of non-dissenters
by dissenters, how will she predict the average opinion change?
The principal is aware of this, so she constructs focus groups which con-
sist of both heterogeneous and homogenous mixtures of dissenters and non-
dissenters. She then weights each focus group consensus about the policy
enaction in order to create an estimator of the population consensus of the
policy enaction. I find that as the focus groups grow in size and in number,
the better this estimator is of the actual population consensus.
I then show that if the principal can not differentiate between non-
dissenters and dissenters, then randomly sampling members of the population
and putting them into groups can still estimate the population consensus.
Finally, I show that if the homogenous focus groups (those containing all
non-dissenters or all dissenters) are removed and the estimator just uses het-
erogeneous focus groups to estimate the population consensus, not only will
this new heterogeneous estimator also approach the population consensus,
but for sufficiently large enough focus groups, the heterogeneous focus group
estimator is better than the estimator that contains both heterogeneous and
homogenous groups.
This would suggest that in populations with heterogeneous opinions and
heterogeneous opinion strengths, heterogeneous focus groups may provide a
better a prediction. Heterogeneous focus groups provide the advantage of
seeing if one particular group can be influenced by another group.
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2 Population Model
Suppose a principal is trying to decide if a policy will be successful or not.
She has two choices: either to enact the policy or to not enact the policy. If
she chooses to not enact the policy, nothing happens. Suppose the success
of the policy depends of the average opinion of a population, which I will
denote with Et.
Let the population be arbitrary large and be composed of two types: non-
dissenters and dissenters. Let p be the proportion of non-dissenters in the
population, and let (1− p) be the proportion of dissenters in the population.
If a signal is sent from the principal to either the population or a particular
focus group that the policy will be enacted, then non-dissenters set their prior
distributions of their opinion of the policy to βi,0 ∼ N(1, σ2β) and dissenters
set their prior distributions of their opinion of the policy to αi,0 ∼ N(0, σ2α)
where σ2β ≥ σ2α . In other words, the non-dissenter is generally positive
about the policy change, but has a wider range of possible values for the
policy change. The dissenters, on the other hand, have a much more narrow
distribution of possible values for the policy change, and these values tend
to be less than the non-dissenter. After the signal has been sent and priors
have been chosen, the members of either the focus group or the population
interact by sending signals to each other. Both non-dissenters and dissenters
have normal likelihood distributions with σ2 = 1.1 If we allow b = 1
σ2β
and
a = 1
σ2α
2 then the updating equation for the any non-dissenter k will be3:
1See Appendix A.2 for further details
2These would be considered the precisions of the distributions for both the non-dissenter
and dissenter, respectively.
3See Appendix A.1 for the derivation from a standard normal-normal conjugate
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βk,m+1 =
βk,t(b+t)+xt
b+t+1
and for any dissenter l:
αl,m+1 =
αl,t(a+t)+xt
a+t+1
where is xt is the signal of an opinion received at time t. Both of these
updating equations represent a weighted prior opinion and signal of another
opinion weighted by one. When either a non-dissenter or a dissenter receive a
signal of an opinion, they form new prior opinions based on the opinion they
received from the member they met and their former opinion4. Their former
opinion is weighted based on their opinion strength, so that dissenters weigh
their opinion more at any time period t. As t increases, both non-dissenters
and dissenters weigh their opinion more and more.
2.1 Population Behavior
Suppose the principal enacts the policy and all members of the population
receive the signal of the policy enaction. Once priors are chosen, population
members interact by randomly pairing up and sending their mean value of
their distribution of opinions. Let γi,t be the mean of an arbitrary member
of the population, where γi,t ∈ {αi,t, βi,t}. Any consumer i is just as likely
to meet any consumer j (uniform probability). Suppose at time period t
consumer i meets consumers j, and they exchange opinions about the policy
4The reason this is assumed is because they could also “wait” for more opinions before
they change their mind. This would result in the population eventually converging to p.
However, people often do not “wait” for other opinions to determine their own. People
will eventually give into social pressure, as having a certain opinion yields social capital
vs being indecisive. For a series of experiments on this, see (Asch 1955) [2]
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enaction. After they talk, both consumer j and i form new priors based on
the opinion they received, in other words:
γi,t+1 =
γi,t(ci+t)+γj,t
ci+t+1
and γj,t+1 =
γj,t(cj+t)+γi,t
cj+t+1
where ci, cj ∈ {a, b}. Since the proportion of dissenters and non-dissenters are
(1−p) and p, respectively, then the expected value function of the population
at time t (or the average population opinion at time t) can be defined as:
Et = pBt + (1− p)At (1)
where At is the expected value of all the dissenters, or
At+1 =
At(a+ t) + Et
a+ t+ 1
(2)
and Bt is the expected value of all the non-dissenters, or
Bt+1 =
Bt(b+ t) + Et
b+ t+ 1
(3)
Both Bt and At can be seen as what happens to the average non-dissenter
or dissenter at time t (respectively). At time 0, B0 = 1, A0 = 0, and E0 = p.
Given enough interactions in the population, the opinions of the dissenters
and the non-dissenters become more and more alike, until they eventually
reach a consensus.
Definition 1 A consensus, µf (a, b, p), is when the limits expected value of
both the non-dissenters and dissenters have the same mean, or, limt(At) =
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limt(Bt) = limt(Et) = µf (a, b, p)
Theorem 1 The population reaches a consensus as t goes to infinity
Proof:
Suppose At+1 = At. Then:
At =
At(a+t)+Et
a+t+1
At(a+ t+ 1) = At(a+ t) + Et
At(a+ t+ 1− (a+ t)) = Et
At = Et
A similar proof can be done for the sequence Bt. Thus when At = At+1,
At = Et and when Bt = Bt+1, Bt = Et. By Corollaries 1.1, If At 6= At+1,
then At < At+1. Similarly, by Corollaries 1.2, if Bt 6= Bt+1, then Bt > Bt+1.
By extension of corollary 1.3, if At 6= Et 6= Bt, then Bt > Et > At. Finally, by
Lemma 1, since Bt ≥ At, then the a consensus is reached when At = Bt = Et.
This behavior can be seen in the graph below:
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2.2 The Naive Prediction
Definition 2 The naive prediction is the principal’s prediction when she
assumes that dissenters and non-dissenters will not influence each other
In other words, naive prediction is the belief that all non-dissenters will
support the policy enaction and the dissenters will not. If she were to be
“naive”, she would believe that the opinions of neither the dissenter nor the
non-dissenter will change when they interact. If we interpret the means of
both dissenters and non-dissenters as the probability that will support the
enaction, then the average naive prediction per member is p. I will later show
that using only homogenous focus groups will yield the same result.
The naive prediction can sometimes be correct, if we difference the ex-
pected value function once, then:
∆Et = Et+1 − Et = p(1− p)(At −Bt) a−b(1+b+t)(1+a+t)
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If a = b, p = 0, or (1 − p) = 0 then ∆Et = 0, and E0 = µf = p. In other
words, if the population has homogenous opinions (all non-dissenters or all
dissenters) or opinion strength, then the population consensus is the prior
population average opinion, or p.
However, if a 6= b and 0 < p < 1, then the naive prediction will be wrong.
Below is a graph of the difference between naive prediction and the population
consensus, or p− µf (p, a, b):
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3 Focus Group Model
Suppose that the principal knows p, the proportion of non-dissenters in the
population, and that she can differentiate between the two types in the pop-
ulation (dissenter and non-dissenter)5. Assume that the principal can not
5This assumption is removed in Section 4
10
determine a, b, and the functional form of αi,t or βi,t. In order to estimate
the population consensus, the principal will create focus groups of size n.
Definition 3 A focus group is a tuple of non-dissenters and dissenters
Let βi denote a non-dissenter in the ith position in the focus group, and
let αj denote a dissenter in the jth position in the focus group. The set of
focus groups of size n, or Ωn is Cartesian product of {βi, αj}n, or for any size
n, Ωn = {β, α}n. Thus, for any n, the number of possible focus groups is 2n.
Let Xni ∈ Ωn denote a particular focus group.
The principal creates the focus group Xni by picking out n consumers and
ordering them in a set so that Xni = (γ1, γ2, . . . γn) where each γi ∈ {αi, βi},
and has an opinion strength ci ∈ {a, b}. In other words, a ordered list of
dissenters and non-dissenters. For example, the focus group (β1, α2, β3) de-
notes a focus group of size three with a non-dissenter in the first position,
a dissenter in the second position, and another non-dissenter in the third
position. The focus group starts by the moderator allowing γ1 to send his
signal to γ2, . . . γn, after which all but γ1 updates and forms a new prior
mean. For example, in the focus group {β1, α2, β3}, β1 will speak. Thus, for
any consumer i 6= 1 in the focus group, the distribution of their mean can be
written as followed:
γi,1 =
γi,0(c) + γ1,0
ci + 1
(4)
The moderator then allows γ2 to speak, thus for any consumer i 6= 1, 2
γi,2 =
γi,1(c+ 1) + γ2,1
ci + 2
(5)
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Which can be reduced to
γi,2 =
γi,0(c) + γ1,0 + γ2,1
ci + 2
(6)
This process will continue, until the ith step, where the ith member signals
everyone (but do not signal themselves). In general, for any consumer i, once
every consumer has given their signal, can be written as followed
γi,n−1 =
γi,0(c) +
∑n
j=1,j 6=i γj,j−1
ci + n− 1 (7)
Define a “round” as going through all consumers once, so that at any round6
u, ru = u(n− 1). As more and more rounds occur, the opinions of the non-
dissenters and dissenters become closer and closer together, and eventually
a consensus will occur among the focus group members.
Below is an example of the focus group (β1, α2, β3, α4) interacting and
updating, where b=1 and a=9:
6An alternative way of writing these equations with the mean instead of the summation
of all other players is shown in Appendix C
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3.0.1 Heterogeneous and Homogenous Focus Groups
Definition 4 A homogenous focus group is a focus group which contains
all non-dissenters or all dissenters
Definition 5 A heterogeneous focus group is a focus group which is
not a homogenous focus group
For any set of focus groups of size n, Ωn, there is exactly two homogenous
focus groups: the all non-dissenter focus group, which I will denote by Xβ,
and the all dissenter focus group, which will be denoted by Xα. Since for any
n both of these groups all have the same prior and all send the same signal
their consensuses will always be xβ = 1 and xα = 0.
Definition 6 The naive focus group estimator, φn, is a focus group
estimator which uses only homogenous focus groups
Suppose we choose both homogenous focus groups of size n in the model
and weighted them accordingly, or:
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φn = pXβ + (1− p)Xα
φn = p(1) + (1− p)(0)
φn = p
Notice that this is the same as the “naive prediction”, or the prediction that
the principal believe she will earn if she thought that the dissenters would
not influence the non-dissenters.
In Section 4, I will show that there is a systematic bias from homogenous
focus groups and that removing both of the homogenous focus groups pro-
vides a better estimate when there is a large difference between the opinion
strengths, b and a, of the non-dissenters and the dissenters.
Theorem 2 Any focus group Xni reaches a consensus, limu(X
n
i ) = x
n
i
Proof:
This follows from Lemma 2 and Corollary 3.1, if there is a unique dissenter,
αi, and a unique non-dissenter, βj, so that for any round ru min(Xi,n) = αi
and max(Xi,n) = βj and αi,ru < αi,ru+1 and βj,ru < βj,ru+1 as long as
αi,ru 6= βj,ru .
In a similar proof to Theorem 1, when αi,ru = αi,ru+1 , then αi,ru is equal to
the average opinion value of the focus group at the end of a paticular round,
γˆru . Similarly, if βj,ru = βj,ru+1 , then βj,ru = γˆru . Since both the maximium
and the mininium are equal to the mean, they must be equal to each other,
or βj,ru = γˆru = αi,ru . Thus, every memeber of the focus group must be
equal to each other. Therefore, if there were expected values for both the
non-dissenters and dissenters, they would be equal as well.
The difference between Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 is that in the popu-
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lation, any member i can meet any member j. This random process creates
systematic error similar to a random walk. Thus, proving that a consensus
exists involves an expected value function, Et. The focus groups, on the other
hand, do not suffer from this type of error. Theorem 2 involves finding the
unique maximum non-dissenter and the unique minimum dissenter. Then
showing that after each round, the distribution of the minimum dissenter
is monotonically increasing around the mean, while the distribution of the
maximum non-dissenter is monotonically decreasing.
After all focus groups in the set of focus groups, Ωn, have reached a con-
sensus, the principal takes the weighted mean of the probability of picking
out that ordering. For example, if p = .6, then the probability of picking
out a non-dissenter, a dissenter, and a non-dissenter is (.6)(.4)(.6) = .144,
thus the consensus of the focus group {β1, α2, β3} will be weighted by .144.
These weighted consensuses are added up together to create an estimator,
ζn, where n is the size of the focus groups. Let xn be the set of all focus
group concensuses for focus groups of size n. So that for focus group i of size
n, xni ∈ xn. If p is the proportion of non-dissenters in the population, then
ζn is calculated by”
ζn =
∑n
j=0
∑
xni ∈xn(p
n−j)((1− p)j)(xni )
Theorem 3 The limit of ζn(p, a, b), or limn(ζn(p, a, b)) is the population con-
sensus, µf (p, a, b)
Consider the distribution of opinion values at time period 0. At time
period 0, signals are sent from the principal to the population. There are
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two opinion values possible, that of the non-dissenters, whose distribution is
centered at the opinion value 1, or βi,0 = 1, and that of the dissenters, whose
distribution is centered at the opinion value 0, or αj,0 = 0. Thus, we can
write a probability distribution of opinion values at time period zero:
P0(X = x) =
 p if β0(1− p) if α0
At time period one, the distribution now has four different opinion values:
1. A non-dissenter met another non-dissenter with probability p2
2. A dissenter met another dissenter with probability (1− p)2
3. A non-dissenter met a dissenter with probability p(1− p)
4. A dissenter met a non-dissenter with probability (1− p)p
Thus, at time period 1, the probability distribution is:
P1(X = x) =

p2 if β0(β0)
(1− p)p if β0(α0)
(1− p)p if α0(β0)
(1− p)2 if α0(α0)
In general, at any time t, there are at most 2t+1 possible opinions to be
held in the population. Suppose zit is a particular opinion held at time period
t and let zit ∈ Zt denote the set of all opinion values at time t. Suppose an
arbitrary opinion held at time, zit, is the result of meeting aˆ dissenters and
bˆ non-dissenters, where both aˆ and bˆ include the signal that the consumer
received at time period 0. In other words, the consumer meets themselves
at time period zero. The probability of a particular consumer having the
opinion zit is then (p)
bˆ(1 − p)aˆ. Let Pt be the probability distribution of all
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possible opinions at time period t, zit. In general
7 :
Pt(Zt = z
t
i |aˆ, bˆ) = pbˆ(1− p)aˆ
This allows us to write the expected opinion value at time period t, Et, as:
Et =
∑
zit∈Zt(z
t
i)[Pt(Y = z
t
i)]
Consider the last member to speak in any focus group of size n. For example,
in the focus group (α1, β2, α3), then α3 would be the last member to “speak”
each round. Now consider the set of the opinion values of all last members
to speak of focus groups of size n at the end of the first round. For example,
after α1, β2,and α3 speak, the opinion value of α3 would be in this set. Call
this set ωn. Consider the case of ω1, since both focus groups are of size one
and are the homogenous focus groups Xβ and Xα, ω1 = 1, 0. This is the
same as Z0, since this is when signals are received and the only values are 1
and 0. Below is an example of the relationship between opinion values during
population interaction and the last member of each focus group. Specifically,
P3 and the focus group (β1, α2, β3, α4). Notice that the last member in the
focus group of size four would have a corresponding opinion value in the
population at time period 38:
7Visual examples of Pt for time periods t = 0, 1 and 2 are shown in Appendix D.1
8A more complete example for n = 2 and t = 1 is shown in Appendix D
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p=.6(1-p)=.4(1-p)(p)=.24(1-p)2(p)=.096
(1-p)2(p)2=.058
In general:
ωn = Zn−1
Now consider the set of all consensus values for all focus groups of size n,
xn. If n increases without bound, then a focus group of size n will “almost
surely” reach a consensus before the last member of each focus group of size
n has spoken. When a focus group reaches a consensus, all members in the
focus group have the same value xin. Thus, the last member of each focus
group of size n has an opinion value that is the consensus. Thus:
limn(xn) = limn(ωn)
Since the ωn = Zn−1, then limn(xn) = limn(ωn) = limn(Zn−1). From The-
orem 1, the limit of the expected value of opinions in the population is the
population consensus, or limt(Et) = µf . From above, we know that:
Et =
∑
zit∈Zt(z
t
i)[Pt(Y = z
t
i)]
limt(Et) =
∑
zit∈limt(Zt)(z
t
i)[Pt(Y = z
t
i)]
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µf =
∑
zit∈limt(Zt)(z
t
i)[Pt(Y = z
t
i)]
Since limt(Zt) = limn(xn), we can replace all opinion values at time period
t, zti with focus group consensuses x
n
i . Thus:
µf =
∑
xni ∈limn(xn)(x
t
i)[Pn(Y = x
n
i )]
The probability distribution of the consensuses would be the weights attached
to them9. For example, the probability of the principal of randomly picking
out two non-dissenters and one dissenter is p2(1− p). Hence:
µf = limn(ζn)
Thus, the limit of the focus group estimator is the population consensus.
Theorem 4 The focus group estimator ζn(p, a, b) is a strictly consistent es-
timator for the population consensus µf (p, a, b)
We wish to show that the focus group estimator is monotonically decreasing,
or:
ζ1 ≥ ζ2 ≥ · · · ≥ ζn ≥ ζn+1 (8)
From Lemma 6, if a = b, then xni = γ¯0, this reduces ζ2 to:
ζ2 = p
2 + p(1− p)x1 + p(1− p)x2
ζ2 = p
2 + p(1− p)(.5) + p(1− p)(.5)
ζ2 = p
2 + p(1− p)
ζ2 = p(p+ 1− p)
ζ2 = p
9This idea is further explained in Theorem 5
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and in general
ζn = p
n + pn−1(1− p)(n−1
n
) + · · ·+ p(1− p)n−1( 1
n
)
ζn = p
n + pn−1(1− p) + · · ·+ p(1− p)n−1
ζn = p(p
n−1 + pn−2(1− p) + · · ·+ (1− p)n−1)
ζn = p
∑n−1
i=0 p
n−1−i(1− p)i
ζn = p
∑n−1
k=0 p
k−i(1− p)i
ζn = p
Thus, if a = b, ζ1 ≥ ζ2 ≥ · · · ≥ ζn ≥ ζn+1, since p ≥ p ≥ p · · · ≥ p ≥ p.
If a goes to infinity, then every focus group consensus expect for the focus
group containing all non-dissenters, Xβ, will be zero, or for any X
n
i ∈ Ωn,
lim(Xni )u = x
n
i = 0. Thus, ζn = p
n. Thus if a goes to infinity, ζ1 ≥ ζ2 ≥
· · · ≥ ζn ≥ ζn+1 because p ≥ p2 ≥ · · · ≥ pn ≥ pn+1.
From Lemma 5, we showed that for every x′i(a) ≤ 0, thus for every a ∈ [b,∞):
ζ1 ≥ ζ2 ≥ · · · ≥ ζn ≥ ζn+1
Thus, ζn is a strictly consistent estimator for µf (p, a, b).
Below is a graph illustrating Theorem 4, the purple dots represent ζn
of size n = 1, 2, . . . , 12 and the functions At, Bt, and Et for time periods
t = 0, . . . , 11.
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This means that if we increase the size and number of focus groups in
a systematic way, the estimator ζn becomes consistently better. Suppose
we decided to be systematic in a different way, for example we increase the
size of the focus groups but screen who we choose to only have homogenous
focus groups. If this were the case, the model would give us p every time,
since this is the average between the homogenous non-dissenter group and
the homogenous dissenter focus group, no matter how large n becomes.
In the next section, I will show that you can drop the systematic screening
of non-dissenters and dissenters in the model and still approach ζn and that
this estimator is better than the all homogenous focus group estimator.
4 Removing the Differentiation Assumption
At the beginning of the focus group model section, the assumption was
made that the principal knew p and could differentiate between the non-
dissenters and dissenters. In this section, I will show that both of these
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assumptions can be removed, and we can still approach the estimator ζn.
For example, suppose the principal chose to use focus groups of size three, or
n = 3. The principal randomly chooses a consumer γ1 from the population,
and puts this consumer 1st in an ordered set. She also picks a second and
third consumer, γ2, γ3, who will be the 2
nd and 3rd members, respectively.
Suppose the proportion of dissenters in the population is p. Then, with
probability p3, this set will be {β1, β2, β3}. With probability p2(1 − p), the
set will be {β1, α2, β3}. In general, the probability of sampling n individuals
and putting them in a particular focus group with b non-dissenters and a
dissenters is pb(1−p)a. Since we are sampling focus groups Xn1 , Xn2 , . . . , Xn2n
with the probability distribution of their weights, we will get the same exact
result as above. Define ζˆn as the sample mean of the focus groups. In other
words, if we sample v consumers in put them into focus groups of size n
and v
n
= h, where h is a positive integer, and each focus group consensus is
denoted by yni then:
ζˆn =
1
h
∑h
i=1 y
n
i
4.0.2 Theorem 5
ζˆn is an unbiased estimator for the estimator ζn
Proof:
We wish to show that E(ζˆn) − ζn = 0. Suppose h focus groups are sam-
pled and, as in Section 3, reach a consensus yi , and let the sample set of
focus group consensuses be yn1 , y
n
2 , . . . , y
n
h . Since:
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ζˆn =
1
h
∑h
i=1 y
n
i
group all yni = y
n
j so that we can rewrite the above equation as
ζˆn =
1
h
∑h
i=1 gi(y
n
i )
Where gi is the sum of any i where y
n
i = y
n
j . Since the probability of getting
a consensus yi is p
b(1 − p)a, we can order these consensuses so that yni has
the same ordering as Ωn, then the expected value of the above equation is:
E(ζˆn) =
1
h
∑h
i=1 h(p
n−j)((1− p)j)(yni )
For example, if we sample h members from the population and put them
in focus groups, then we should expect to create focus groups which have a
dissenters and b non-dissenters h(pn−j)((1− p)j) times. Thus, we can write
the above expected value function as:
E(ζˆn) =
∑h
i=1(p
n−j)((1− p)j)(yni )
Which is equivalent to ζn. Thus:
E(ζˆn)− ζn = 0
In the next section, I will show that if we drop the homogenous focus groups
Xβ and Xα we tend to get better estimates than an estimate which uses both
homogenous focus groups and heterogeneous focus groups.
5 Heterogeneous Estimators
Suppose, that instead of using ζn to estimate the final population consensus,
we used an estimator that picked only the heterogeneous focus groups. Let
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ηn denote a focus group estimator that drops both the homogenous non-
dissenter focus group and the homogenous dissenter focus group. Thus if
Ωg = Ωn / {Xβ, Xα}:
ηn =
∑n−1
j=1
∑
i∈Ωg(p
n−j)((1− p)j)(xni )
Theorem 8 and 9 will highlight two important ideas: That heterogeneous
focus groups are a better estimator of population behavior when n is suf-
ficiently large enough (Theorem 6) and when there is a large difference in
opinion strength (Theorem 7). In order to further drive these theorems, I
will also do the same proofs, but with an estimator that weights the all non-
dissenter focus group with p2n instead of pn. In other words, I will weight
the homogenous groups less than the heterogeneous groups.
5.0.3 Theorem 6
If ηn ≥ µf , then ηn is a better predictor than ζn
Proof:
We wish to show that
|ζn − µf | ≥ |ηn − µf |
Since we assumed that ηn ≥ µf , and ζn ≥ µf , then
ζn − µf ≥ ηn − µf
ζn ≥ ηn
pn ≥ 0
Note that if we replace ηn with an estimator that weights the all non-dissenter
group with a lower weight(such as p2n), then the above reduces to:
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pn ≥ p2n
This Theorem is important because ηn starts off smaller than µf , but quickly
grows to be larger than µf . This behavior can be seen below:
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5.0.4 Theorem 7
If a is arbitrary large, then ηn is a better predictor of µf than ζn
Remember that from Theorem 3, lima→∞ ζn = pn. This is because both
homogenous focus groups, Xα and Xβ, are unaffected by changes in a or
b, and thus only the consensus of the all non-dissenter group is left. Since
this group is removed from ηn, then lima→∞ ηn = 0. As a goes to infinity
the population consensus will go to zero, or lima→∞ µf = 0. This means
that as a goes to infinity, the heterogeneous focus group estimator will equal
the population consensus, or lima→∞ ηn = lima→∞ µf , while the focus group
estimator ζn will be larger than the population consensus, or lima→∞ ζn ≥
lima→∞ µf . Since the homogenous focus groups are unaffected by changes
in opinion strength, ζ ′n(a) = η
′
n(a). What this means is that the driving force
behind the bias of ζn is that homogenous focuses groups are unaffected by
changes in opinion strength and are not swayed by the opinions of others.
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6 Conclusion
In the first section of this paper, I presented a model of a population which
contain members that were proned to being influenced by the stronger opin-
ions of others. Then, I constructed model of focus groups which contained
members of this population. From there I showed if you weighed the results
of these focus groups correctly, that this estimated how the population would
behave.
This estimator approaches the behavior the population, but only because
of the heterogeneous focus groups. As we increased the size and number of
these focus groups, the estimator accounted for more heterogeneous inter-
actions, thus the estimator became a more accurate picture of what would
happen in the population if the policy were to take place.
A major flaw in this model is the assumption that every member in the
population is just as likely to talk to another member in the population. If
groups within a population are highly segregated, homogenous focus groups
may be a better choice. However, the most frequent separation between focus
group participants is by gender (Fern 35) [3], and men and women interact
daily with each other. Would it really be wise in this case to separate focus
groups by gender? Groups of people are not just people in groups, and that
if focus group researchers want to understand how a group will react to a
change, then they should treat focuses groups not as individuals but as a
singular object.
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7 Appendices
7.1 Appendix A
7.1.1 Appendix A.1
When using Bayesian inference, it is convenient to use conjugate priors, for
both the population and the focus group models this paper uses the normal-
normal prior conjugate relationship, where the standard deviation of the
likelihood, σ2, is known. If the prior distribution is N(µ0, σ
2
0) and x1, . . . , xn
are the signals received, then the posterior parameters are given by
µ1 =
µ0
σ20
+
∑n
i xi
σ2
1
σ20
+ n
σ2
and σ21 = (
1
σ20
+ n
σ2
)−1
(A.1.1)
If we let τ0 =
1
σ20
, n = 1, and σ2 = 1, then the above equations reduces to
µ1 =
µ0τ0+x1
τ0+1
and σ21 = (τ0 + 1)
−1
Since in the model, several iterations of the above equation occur, it may be
useful to find a way to write the posterior of τ at time t, taut, using just
tau0. Let τt =
1
σ2t
, thus:
σ21 = (τ0 + 1)
−1
τ−11 = (τ0 + 1)
−1
τ1 = τ0 + 1
τ2 = τ1 + 1 = τ0 + 2
τt = τ0 + t
Thus, if xt is the signal at time period t, then:
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µt+1 =
µt(τt)+xt
τt+1
µt+1 =
µt(τ0+t)+xt
τ0+t+1
Thus, we have a similar updating function if τ0 ∈ {a, b}.
7.1.2 Appendix A.2
Referencing equation (A.1.1) from above,
µ1 =
µ0
σ20
+
∑n
i xi
σ2
1
σ20
+ n
σ2
and σ21 = (
1
σ20
+ n
σ2
)−1
Let pi0 =
σ2
σ20
, and since in the model consumers update every round, let∑n
i xi = x1 and n = 1. Thus, we can rewrite the above equation as:
µ1 =
µ0pi0+x1
pi0+1
and pi1 =
pi0
pi0+1
When the set of equations above are reframed this way, we can see that the
likelihood takes on a new meaning with respect to opinion strength. The
standard deviation of the likelihood could be thought of as the ”trustworthi-
ness” of the sender. For example, if the standard deviation of the likelihood,
σ2 is high, then x1 is weighted less. This idea could be used for an extension
or generalization of the model, but for simplicity I will assume that everyone
trusts each other equally.
7.2 Appendix B
Lemma 1 Bt ≥ At for all time periods t
Base Case: Since the initial value of all non-dissenters is 1, then B0 = 1.
Likewise, A0 = 0. Thus B0 ≥ A0.
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Inductive Step: Suppose Bt ≥ At and a > b. We wish to show that
Bt+1 ≥ At+1.
Since Bt+1 =
Bt(b+t)+Et
b+t+1
and At+1 =
At(a+t)+Et
a+t+1
:
Bt(b+t)+Et
b+t+1
≥ At(a+t)+Et
a+t+1
(Bt(b+ t) + Et)(a+ t+ 1) ≥ (At(a+ t) + Et)(b+ t+ 1)
Bt(b+ t)(a+ t+ 1) + Et(a+ t+ 1) ≥ At(a+ t)(b+ t+ 1) + Et(b+ t+ 1)
Bt(b+ t)(a+ t+ 1) + Eta ≥ At(a+ t)(b+ t+ 1) + Etb
Bt(ba+ bt+ b+ t
2 + t+ at) + Eta ≥ At(ba+ bt+ a+ t2 + t+ at) + Etb
Btat+Btb ≥ Atbt+ Ata
Bt(at+ b) ≥ At(bt+ a)
Since Bt ≥ At, we can simplify the above expression to:
at+ b ≥ bt+ a
Which simplifies to a ≥ b, which was assumed.
Thus, by induction Bt ≥ At for all time periods t.
Corollary 1.1 Bt ≥ Et ≥ At for all time periods t
First I will show that Et ≥ At, since Et = (1− p)At + (p)Bt:
(1− p)At + (p)Bt ≥ At
pBt ≥ At − At + pAt
Bt ≥ At
Which is true from the above proof. Next, I will show that Bt ≥ Et:
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Bt ≥ (1− p)At + (p)Bt
Bt − pBt ≥ (1− p)At
Bt ≥ At
Which was shown in the above proof.
Thus Bt ≥ Et ≥ At for all time periods t.
Corollary 1.2 Bt+1 ≤ Bt for all time periods t
We wish to show that Bt+1 ≤ Bt, since Bt+1 = Bt(b+t)+Etb+t+1 :
Bt(b+t)+Et
b+t+1
≤ Bt
Bt(b+t)+(1−p)At+(p)Bt
b+t+1
≤ Bt
(b+t)+(1−p)At
Bt
+p
b+t+1
≤ 1
(b+ t) + (1− p)At
Bt
+ p ≤ b+ t+ 1
(1− p)At
Bt
+ p ≤ 1
(1− p)At
Bt
≤ 1− p
At
Bt
≤ 1
At ≤ Bt
Which was shown in the proof above. Thus Bt+1 ≤ Bt for all time periods t
Corollary 1.3 At+1 ≥ At for all time periods t
Much like above:
At(a+t)+Et
a+t+1
≥ At
At(a+t)+(1−p)At+(p)Bt
a+t+1
≥ At
(a+t)+(1−p)+(p)Bt
At
a+t+1
≥ 1
(a+ t) + (1− p) + (p)Bt
At
≥ a+ t+ 1
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−p+ (p)Bt
At
≥ 0
Bt ≥ At
Which was shown in the proof above. Thus At+1 ≥ At for all time periods t.
7.3 Appendix C
7.3.1 Lemma 2
Suppose at round ru, max(Xn) = γk,r and min(Xn) = γl,r, and γk,r 6= γl,r,
then:
γl,r < γl,r+1 and γk,r+1 < γk,r
Proof:
We can rewrite γk,r+1 as:
γk,ru+1 =
γk,ru(c+ ru) +
∑n
j=1,j 6=i γj,ru−j+1
c+ ru + 1
(9)
Let the mean of all γi on round ru be denoted by γ¯ru . Thus, we can rewrite
the summation as
γk,ru+1 =
γk,ru (c+ru)+(n)γ¯ru−γk,ru
c+ru+1
γk,ru+1 =
γk,ru (c+ru−1)+(n)γ¯ru
c+ru+1
Thus, we wish to show:
γk,ru (c+ru−1)+(n)γ¯ru
c+ru+1
< γk,ru
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Since ru = u(n− 1):
γk,ru (c+u(n−1)−1)+(n)γ¯ru
c+(u+1)(n−1) < γk,ru
γk,ru(c+ u(n− 1)− 1) + (n)γ¯ru < γk,ru(c+ (u+ 1)(n− 1))
(n)γ¯ru < γk,ru [(c+ (u+ 1)(n− 1))− (c+ u(n− 1)− 1)]
(n)γ¯ru < (n)γk,ru
γ¯ru < γk,ru
Since γk,ru is the max at round ru, this is true. A symmetric proof can be
done to show that γl,r ≤ γl,r+1. Thus, for any round ru with max(Xn) = γk,r
and min(Xn) = γl,r, γl,r < γl,r+1 < γk,r+1 < γk,r.
7.3.2 Lemma 3
Suppose βj,ru < βi,ru , then βj,ru+1 < βi,ru+1 .
Proof:
This follows trivially from the generalized updating formula:
βj,ru(b+ ru − 1) + nγ¯ru
b+ ru+1
<
βi,ru(b+ ru − 1) + nγ¯ru
b+ ru+1
(10)
Likewise, if αj,ru ≤ αi,ru , then αj,ru+1 ≤ αi,ru+1 .
7.3.3 Corollary 3.1
For each focus group Xi,n, there is a unique αi and βj so that at the end of
any round ru, min(Xi,n) = αi and max(Xi,n) = βj. That is, there is a unique
max and min for each focus group.
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7.3.4 Lemma 5
For any focus group Xni , x
n
i
′(a) ≤ 0.
Proof:
We know from Corollary 3.1, that for any Xni , there exists a element αi,ru
which is always the minimum for any u. Thus, if az ≥ as, we wish to show:
αi,ru (az+ru−1)+nγ¯ru
az+ru+1
≤ αi,ru (as+ru−1)+nγ¯ru
as+ru+1
αi,ru(az + ru − 1)(as + ru+1) + nγ¯ru(as + ru+1) ≤
αi,ru(as + ru − 1)(az + ru+1) + nγ¯ru(az + ru+1)
as[(ru − 1)αi,ru + nγ¯ru ] ≤ az[(ru − 1)αi,ru + nγ¯ru ]
as ≤ az
Thus xni
′(a) ≤ 0.
7.3.5 Lemma 6
lima→∞ xni = 0
Proof:
αk+1,ru+1 =
αk,ru (a+ru−1)+nγ¯ru
a+ru+1
lima→∞
αk,ru (a+ru−1)+nγ¯ru
a+ru+1
lima→∞
αk,ru (a+ru−1)
a+ru+1
+ lima→∞
nγ¯ru
a+ru+1
(αk,ru) lima→∞
(a+ru−1)
a+ru+1
(αk,ru)(1)
αk+1,ru+1 = αk,ru
αk+1,ru+1 = αk,ru = αk−1,ru = · · · = α0,ru = 0
Since lim(αi) is the consensus, we can conclude that lima→∞ xni = 0.
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7.4 Appendix D
At the end of the first round without including the last member, the set of
the last members of each focus group, ωn, is equivalent to set of values(or
members) at time n = t in the expected value population model, Et.
7.4.1 Example: Focus Groups of size two
Suppose n=2, then we have the focus groups Ω2 = {β, β}, {α, β}, {β, α}, {α, α}.
If we only allow the first members to send signals, then the last members have
posteriors {β|β}, {β|α}, {α|β}, {α|α}. At time two in the population model,
the possible types of posterior distributions are {β|β}, {β|α}, {α|β}, {α|α}.
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7.4.2 Appendix D.1
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